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a b s t r a c t
In this paper,we give a family of elliptic curves E in the form y2 = x3−c over the prime field
Fp with embedding degree k = 1. This was carried out by computing the explicit formula
of the number of points #E(Fp) of the elliptic curve y2 = x3 − c . Using this computation,
we show that the elliptic curve y2 = x3 − 1 over Fp for the primes p of the form 27A2 + 1
has an embedding degree k = 1. Finally, we give examples of those primes p for which the
security level of the pairing-based cryptographic protocols on the curve y2 = x3 − 1 over
Fp is equivalent to 128-, 192-, or 256-bit AES keys.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and preliminaries
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fp with the identity element∞. The embedding degree of E is defined to be
the smallest integer k such that n | pk − 1, where n is the largest prime divisor of #E(Fp) and gcd(n, p) = 1. In recent years,
elliptic curves with small embedding degree have a great interest for implementing pairing-based cryptographic systems.
Although, many papers have proposed different families of elliptic curves with embedding degree k ≥ 2, we know of few
papers [1–5] that mention the families with embedding degree k = 1. The first detailed work of embedding degree k = 1
curves is given by Koblitz and Menezes in [4]. They discuss the family of curves of the form y2 = x3 − dx over Fp with
p = A2 + 1, and then they give examples for these primes p > 2 with d = 1 and d = 4.
In this paper, we will focus our attention to the elliptic curves y2 = x3− c over Fp and show how to obtain elliptic curves
with embedding degree k = 1 from this family: let E be the elliptic curve given by the equation
y2 = x3 − c (1)
over Fp with prime p > 3 and c ∈ F∗p = Fp \ {0}. We are going to first compute #E(Fp). For this, we divide the primes
into two cases: when p ≡ 2(mod 3), one knows that #E(Fp) = p + 1 (see [6, Proposition 4.31]). When p ≡ 1 (mod 3), it
was already known that #E(Fp) can be expressed in terms of the characters and Jacobi sums [7]. Our contribution here is to
compute the explicit formula for #E(Fp), which will be given in Theorem 1.
Wewill now give several important facts which are essential in proving ourmain results in Section 2. For amore detailed
background, one can refer to chapters 1, 8, 9 of [7] and chapters 2, 3 of [8].
The elliptic curve E given by Eq. (1) with p ≡ 1 (mod 3) has the endomorphism ring isomorphic to the ring Z[δ] =
Z[x]/⟨x2 + x + 1⟩, where δ = −1+i
√
3
2 is the complex cube root of unity. Moreover, the corresponding endomorphism
δ : E → E is given by the map (x, y) → δ(x, y) = (λx, y), where λ is a primitive cube root of unity in F∗
p2
.
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The elements τ = a+ bδ in Z[δ]with a, b ∈ Z are called Eisenstein integers, and τ¯ is the ordinary complex conjugate of
τ . One can check that τ¯ = a+bδ2 = (a−b)−bδ and N(τ ) = τ τ¯ = a2+b2−ab, where N : Z[δ] → Z is the norm function.
In fact, Z[δ] is a Euclidean domain under the norm function. The units of Z[δ] are Z[δ]∗ = {±1,±δ,±δ2} = ⟨−δ⟩ ∼= Z6.
The Frobenius endomorphismΦp corresponding to τ = a+bδ inZ[δ] (unique up to complex conjugation) is determined
by the characteristic polynomial x2 − (2a − b)x + (a2 + b2 − ab) of the left multiplication by τ . This gives the following
equalities:
Tr(τ ) = τ + τ¯ = 2a− b = t
N(τ ) = τ τ¯ = a2 + b2 − ab = p.
It follows from Hasse’s theorem that #E(Fp) = p+1− t . All representations of p are in the form p = N(uτ) and p = N(uτ¯ ),
where u ∈ Z[δ]∗. Therefore, there is exactly 12-representations producing p = a2+b2−ab. All possible traces corresponding
to these representations of p are the following:
±(2a− b), ±(a− 2b), ±(a+ b).
Since p = a2 + b2 − ab ≡ 1 (mod 3), we may restrict the congruences for a and b to six classes: a ≡ 0 (mod 3) and
b ≢ 0 (mod 3), a ≡ 1 (mod 3) and b ≢ 2 (mod 3), a ≡ 2 (mod 3) and b ≢ 1 (mod 3). We would also like to note that there
is an algorithm to compute a, b ∈ Z such that p = a2 + b2 − ab = N(τ ), where τ = a+ bδ ∈ Z[δ] (see [9]).
Definition 1. A character χ is a homomorphism defined by χ : F∗p → C∗. It is convenient to extend the character χ from
F∗p to Fp by setting χ(0) = 1 if χ is trivial, and χ(0) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 2. Let χ and ψ be the characters on F∗p . The Jacobi sum J(χ, ψ) is defined by
J(χ, ψ) =
−
g∈Fp
χ(g)ψ(1− g).
We now need the following facts that the proofs can be found in [8,7].
Proposition 1. Let χtriv , χ2 and χ3 be trivial, quadratic and cubic characters on F∗p , respectively. Then for any character χ , we
have the following:
(1) J(χtriv, χtriv) = p.
(2) J(χtriv, χ) = 0.
(3) |J(χ3, χ3)|2 = p.
(4) J(χ, χ2) = χ(4)J(χ, χ).
Proposition 2. Let p ≡ 1 (mod 3) be a prime. Then J(χ3, χ3) = −1 (mod 3) in Z[δ].
Proposition 3. Let χ3 be a cubic character on F∗p , where p ≡ 1 (mod 3). Then χ3(2) = 1 if and only if p = x2 + 27y2 for some
integers x and y.
2. Main results
Theorem 1. Let p ≡ 1 (mod 3) be a prime, c ∈ F∗p and let χ2, χ3 and χ6 be quadratic, cubic and sextic characters on F∗p ,
respectively. Let E be the elliptic curve given by the equation
y2 = x3 − c
over Fp. Write p = a2 + b2 − ab, where a, b are integers and a+ b ≡ 1 (mod 3), where a ≡ 1 (mod 3), b ≡ 0 (mod 3). Then
#E(Fp) = p+ 1− t is given by the following formulas, where α = 2a− b, β = a+ b and γ = a− 2b.
(i) If p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and χ3(2) = 1, then
t =

α, if χ6(c) = 1
−α, if χ3(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
−β or − γ , if χ2(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
β or γ , if χ2(c) ≠ 1 and χ3(c) ≠ 1.
(ii) If p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and χ3(2) ≠ 1, then
t =

−β or − γ , if χ6(c) = 1
β or γ , if χ3(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
α or − β or − γ , if χ2(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
−α or β or γ , if χ2(c) ≠ 1 and χ3(c) ≠ 1.
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(iii) If p ≢ 1 (mod 4) and χ3(2) = 1, then
t =

−α, if χ6(c) = 1
α, if χ3(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
β or γ , if χ2(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
−β or − γ , if χ2(c) ≠ 1 and χ3(c) ≠ 1.
(iv) If p ≢ 1 (mod 4) and χ3(2) ≠ 1, then
t =

β or γ , if χ6(c) = 1
−β or − γ , if χ3(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
−α or β or γ , if χ2(c) = 1 and χ6(c) ≠ 1
α or − β or − γ , if χ2(c) ≠ 1 and χ3(c) ≠ 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Using the facts given in [6, Section 4.4], the number of points of the elliptic curve y2 = x3 − c over Fp
can be expressed in terms of the characters and Jacobi sums as follows:
#E(Fp) = #{x, y ∈ Fp | y2 = x3 − c} + #{∞}
=
−
m,n∈Fp
m=n−c
#{y2 = m}.#{x3 = n} + 1
=
−
m∈Fp
1−
j=0
χ2(m)j
2−
l=0
χ3(m+ c)l + 1
=
1−
j=0
2−
l=0
−
m∈Fp
χ2(c)jχ2(c−1m)jχ3(c)lχ3(c−1m+ 1)l + 1.
Using the change of variables c−1m = −g in the first summation on the right and by Proposition 1, we get
#E(Fp) =
1−
j=0
χ2(−c)j
2−
l=0
χ3(c)l
−
g∈Fp
χ2(g)jχ3(1− g)l + 1
=
1−
j=0
χ2(−c)j
2−
l=0
χ3(c)lJ(χ
j
2, χ
l
3)+ 1
=
1−
j=0
χ2(−c)j[J(χ j2, χtriv)+ χ3(c)J(χ j2, χ3)+ χ3(c)2J(χ j2, χ23 )] + 1
= J(χtriv, χtriv)+ χ3(c)J(χtriv, χ3)+ χ3(c)2J(χtriv, χ23 )
+χ2(−c)[J(χ2, χtriv)+ χ3(c)J(χ2, χ3)+ χ3(c)2J(χ2, χ23 )] + 1
= p+ 1+ χ2(−c)[χ3(c)J(χ2, χ3)+ χ3(c)2J(χ2, χ23 )]
= p+ 1+ χ2(−c)[χ3(4c)J(χ3, χ3)+ χ3(4c)J(χ3, χ3)]
= p+ 1− τ − τ
where
τ = −χ2(−c)χ3(4c)J(χ3, χ3) ∈ Z[δ].
By using Proposition 2, we can write
τ = −χ2(−c)χ3(4c)J(χ3, χ3) ≡ χ2(−c)χ3(4c) (mod 3)
≡ χ2(−1)χ3(2)2χ2(c)χ3(c) (mod 3).
Lemma 1. Let τ = x+ yδ ∈ Z[δ].
(1) If τ ≡ 1 (mod 3), then x ≡ 1, y ≡ 0 (mod 3) and x+ y ≡ 1 (mod 3).
(2) If τ ≡ −1 (mod 3), then x ≡ 2, y ≡ 0 (mod 3) and x+ y ≡ 2 (mod 3).
(3) If τ ≡ δ (mod 3), then x ≡ 0, y ≡ 1 (mod 3) and x+ y ≡ 1 (mod 3).
(4) If τ ≡ −δ (mod 3), then x ≡ 0, y ≡ 2 (mod 3) and x+ y ≡ 2 (mod 3).
(5) If τ ≡ δ2 (mod 3), then x ≡ 2, y ≡ 2 (mod 3) and x+ y ≡ 1 (mod 3).
(6) If τ ≡ −δ2 (mod 3), then x ≡ 1, y ≡ 1 (mod 3) and x+ y ≡ 2 (mod 3).
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Table 1
Minimum bit lengths of n and p.
Security level in bits 80 128 192 256
Minimum bits of prime subgroup of order n 160 256 384 512
Minimum bits of the field Fp 1024 3072 8192 15360
Proof. Suppose τ ≡ 1 (mod 3), so τ − 1 = 3(u+ vδ) for some u and v in Z. We have
(x− 1)+ yδ = 3u+ 3vδ.
Therefore, x ≡ 1 (mod 3), y ≡ 0 (mod 3) and x+ y ≡ 1 (mod 3). This proves (1). The proofs of (2)–(6) are similar. 
If p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and χ3(2) = 1, then χ2(−1)χ3(2)2χ2(c)χ3(c) = 1 (mod 3) when χ6(c) = 1. Hence, τ ≡ 1 (mod 3).
Lemma 1 yields τ = a + bδ with a ≡ 1, b ≡ 0 (mod 3) and a + b ≡ 1 (mod 3). This proves part of part (i) of Theorem 1.
The other parts are proved similarly. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Let E be the elliptic curve given by the equation
y2 = x3 − 1 (2)
over Fp with p = 27A2+1. It follows from Proposition 3 and Theorem 1(i) that E has an embedding degree 1. It is important
for pairing-based cryptography whether such an elliptic curve of any bit length exists or not. The following remark gives a
conjectural positive answer to this question, in particular it shows that there are infinitely many such primes.
Remark 1. Let P(N) denote the number of primes in the form 27A2 + 1 for 1 ≤ A ≤ N . Bateman and Horn conjecture [10]
indicates
P(N) ∼ 1
2
∏
prime l
l-3

1− χ2(−3)
l− 1
∫ N
2
dA
log A
.
By using the computation in [11, Table 2], it can be checked that
P(N) ∼ 0.560366375
∫ N
2
dA
log A
.
Wewould also like to note that according to Hardy and Littlewood [12, Conjecture F], this value P(N) is asymptotically given
by
P(N) ∼ 0.323527677
√
N
logN
.
For the efficient and secure implementation, prime p should be chosen specifically so that the arithmetic on Fp is fast
and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on F∗p is secure. Taking these into accounts and following [4], we explain how to
choose our parameters.
2.1. Choice of parameters
We must choose A = nh such that n and p = 27A2 + 1 are prime. In order to maximize efficiency, we look for the
following:
• n and p should have the approximate bit lengths in Table 1 that correspond to the desired security level.
• n should be a Solinas prime, i.e, a sum or difference of a small number of powers of 2.
• p should be a special prime that is proposed in [13].
2.2. Parameter sizes
It is well known that for the security of pairing-based cryptosystems, the field Fp must be large enough so that DLP cannot
be solved using the number field sieve and function field sieve algorithm that are the best available algorithms towards DLP.
It is also necessary for the subgroup of prime order n to be large enough to resist the Pollard-ρ attack on DLP. Table 1 shows
the minimum bit lengths of n and p for the desired security level [14,15].
We now give examples considering the above conditions. In our examples, the bit lengths of n and p are equal to or just
a little bit more than the minimum values given in Table 1 for the corresponding security level. We produce these examples
using Maple 12.
Example 1. For 128-bits of security, let n be the prime 2258 − 260 + 1 and let h = 21424. Then p = 27 · (n · h)2 + 1 =
27 · (23364 − 23167 + 23107 + 22968 − 22909 + 22848)+ 1 is prime.
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Example 2. For 192-bits of security, let n be the prime 2384 − 2218 + 1 and let h = 23985. Then p = 27 · (n · h)2 + 1 =
27 · (28738 − 28573 + 28406 + 28355 − 28189 + 27970)+ 1 is prime.
Example 3. For 256-bits of security, let n be the prime 2514 − 2114 + 1 and let h = 27482. Then p = 27 · (n · h)2 + 1 =
27 · (215992 − 215593 + 215479 + 215192 − 215079 + 214964)+ 1 is prime.
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